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APPORTIONING TORT
DAMAGES IN NEW YORK:
A METHOD TO THE MADNESS
PAUL F. KIRGISt
INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the most difficult and confusing aspect of civil
practice in New York is the apportionment of damages in cases
involving multiple tortfeasors. In a complex case, no fewer than
four statutory provisions govern different aspects of the damages
calculation.1 These provisions can interact in ways that the
legislature apparently never considered. The most complex of
them, Article 16 of the New York Civil Practice and Rules
(CPLR), is relatively new, having been enacted in 1986 and
subsequently amended in 1996. As cases demanding its
interpretation make their way through the court system,
problems involving the apportionment of damages promise to
become more and more prevalent.
As yet, no court has addressed in a systematic way the
interaction of these four statutory provisions. The second circuit
made the boldest foray to date, in In re Brooklyn Navy Yard
Asbestos Litigation,2 but that case did not involve culpable
conduct on the part of the plaintiff-a potentially troublesome
ingredient in damages calculations-and the court's methodology
failed to take into account a significant factor in apportioning
damages among culpable defendants. 3
This Article proposes a unified formula for calculating
damages in complex, multiparty tort cases. While the formula is
t Assistant Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. B.A., Colgate
University; J.D., Washington & Lee University School of Law. I am grateful to
Vincent Alexander and Susan Stabile for their comments on an earlier draft.
I See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1401, 1411, 1601 (McKinney 1997) (codifying Articles 14,
14-A, and 16, respectively); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 15-108 (McKinney 1989).
2 971 F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1992).
3 See infra notes 49 & 53 and accompanying text.
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my own, it incorporates the available case law and rests on the
judgments of New York's most prominent civil practice scholars
where no judicial guidance exists. Perhaps the most convincing
claim to legitimacy I can offer, however, is the fact that my
methodology produces results consistent with the principles
motivating the statutory provisions at issue.
I. THE GOVERNING LAW
A. Contribution Under CPLR Article 14
The apportionment of damages among tortfeasors has a
relatively short history in New York. Until 1972, New York
courts-with the tacit approval of the legislature-clung to the
common-law doctrine under which courts refused to make
judgments of the relative degrees of culpability among
wrongdoers. 4 Under this doctrine, with certain exceptions, a tort
defendant could not recover from other tortfeasors amounts that
the first defendant paid above its relative share of fault.5 One
exception was for indemnification. Where the paying
defendant's liability was based entirely on the conduct of some
other person-as in the many incarnations of vicarious
liability-the defendant had a free-standing cause of action for
indemnification in which it could recover all of the judgment it
paid.6  In addition, where the plaintiff sued all possible
defendants, each defendant had a statutory right to recover any
excess paid over its adjudicated share.7 But in the common
4 See Gilbert v. Finch, 66 N.E. 133, 136 (N.Y. 1903) (holding that the release of
a joint tortfeasor "operates to discharge" the other tortfeasors absent a reservation
of right); Peck v. Ellis, 2 Johns. Ch. 131 (N.Y. Ch. 1816) (noting that "a court of lav
will not sustain an action between two joint trespassers"); Merryweather v. Nixan, 8
Durn. & E. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (KYB. 1799) (denying plaintiff recovery of a
contribution from defendant for damages paid by plaintiff in a separate suit).
5 See Ward v. Iroquois Gas Corp., 179 N.E. 317, 318 (N.Y. 1932).
6 See Westchester Lighting Co. v. Westchester County Small Estate Corp., 15
N.E.2d 567, 568-69 (N.Y. 1938). Indemnification is based on the existence of an
express or implied contract shifting the entire liability onto the other party.
7 See JACK D. WEINSTEIN ET AL., 4 NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE: CPLR 1401.01
(describing history of contribution in New York). Under section 211-a of the old Civil
Practice Act, a defendant who paid more than his pro-rata share of the judgment
could recover the excess from another joined defendant. See id. Pro-rata shares were
determined by simply dividing the judgment by the number of defendants, and no
defendant could be forced to pay in contribution more than his pro-rata share. See
Id.
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situation where the plaintiff selected only a "deep-pocket" joint
tortfeasor for suit, that unlucky defendant had no recourse
against the other joint tortfeasors, even if the absent parties bore
much more actual fault.
To soften the perceived harshness of this rule, New York
courts expanded the concept of indemnification to include not
only true vicarious liability situations, but also cases in which
the named defendant could show that its fault was merely
"passive," as distinguished from the "active" culpability of some
other tortfeasor.8 If the paying defendant could make that
showing, it could recover the entire judgment paid from the
"active" tortfeasor. While the active-passive distinction helped
some defendants who would otherwise have been stuck with an
undeserved bill, it produced arbitrary results governed by a
standard that defied consistent application.9
Finally, in 1972, the Court of Appeals stepped in to align
New York with the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions. In
the landmark case of Dole v. Dow Chemical Company, ° the
Court of Appeals held that a joint tortfeasor had a right of
apportionment based on relative degrees of fault." Recognition
of this right necessitated adding a cause of action for
"contribution" to the existing common-law indemnification cause
of action. In cases involving some version of vicarious liability,
the indemnification cause of action would remain, allowing for a
8 See Jackson v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 192 N.E.2d 167, 169-70 (N.Y.
1963) (holding that the party seeking indemnity must not be "in pari delicto" with
the party against whom recovery is sought; he must be a "passive tortfeasor").
9 See Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 282 N.E.2d 288, 291 (N.Y. 1972) ('The 'active-
passive' test to determine when indemnification will be allowed by one party held
liable for negligence against another negligent party has in practice proven elusive
and difficult of fair application."). One problem with the active-passive test was that
the allegations in the complaint determined whether the defendant could seek
indemnification by impleader or cross-claim, leaving a defendant's right to seek
recovery at least partly in the hands of the plaintiff. See Kennedy v. Bethlehem
Steel Co., 125 N.Y.S.2d 552, 552-53 (4th Dep't 1953), affd, 122 N.E.2d 753 (N.Y.
1954).
10 282 N.E.2d 288 (N.Y. 1972).
11 See id. at 295. Dole involved a wrongful death action in which the decedent
was killed as a result of exposure to a Dow fumigant while at work. See id. at 290.
Dow impleaded the employer for indemnification, arguing that the employer's
failure to instruct its employees in the use of the product was the "active" fault,
while any fault on Dow's part for insufficient warnings was only "passive." See id.
The Court of Appeals abandoned the active-passive distinction and held that Dow
could implead the employer even if Dow's fault was to some degree active on a
contribution theory. See id. at 295.
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complete shift of liability. Where joint tortfeasors each bear
some share of fault, however, the contribution cause of action
would henceforward allow any one tortfeasor paying more than
its share to recover the excess from the others.
In 1974, the legislature codified Dole's contribution theory in
Article 14 of the CPLR. CPLR 1401 establishes the basic right to
contribution among joint tortfeasors. 12 CPLR 1402 provides that
contribution is to be determined based on equitable shares of
fault.13 CPLR 1403 provides the procedural mechanisms by
which contribution may be sought. 14 CPLR 1404 makes clear
that the plaintiffs right to recover the full judgment from any
one joint tortfeasor remains intact and that indemnification
remains a viable cause of action in appropriate cases. 15
B. Limitations on Contribution Under General Obligations Law
section 15-108
Dole caused an unintended problem that the legislature
addressed at the same time it passed Article 14. After Dole,
when a plaintiff sued two or more defendants and then settled
with one, the non-settling defendant could implead the settling
defendant back into the case to seek contribution. That created
a powerful incentive not to settle, because a defendant could
never be certain that the settlement would buy peace. To
remedy this problem and encourage settlements, the legislature
passed General Obligations Law (GOL) section 15-108.16
Like Article 14, GOL section 15-108 applies in personal
injury, property damage, and wrongful death cases. The statute
preserves the plaintiffs right to pursue any remaining
tortfeasors after a settlement, but cuts off the settling
defendant's right to seek contribution from the others. 17 Thus, a
settling defendant is stuck with his bargain if he pays more in
settlement than he would have had to pay pursuant to the
verdict. By the same token, the plaintiffs right to recover from
12 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1401 (McKinney 1998). The provision is limited to "two or more
persons who are subject to liability for damages for the same personal injury, injury
to property, or wrongful death." Id.
13 Id. 1402.
14 Id. 1403.
15 Id. 1404.
16 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 15-108 (McKinney 1999).
17 Id. § 15-108(c) ("A tortfeasor who has obtained his own release from liability
shall not be entitled to contribution from any other person.").
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the remaining defendants is reduced by the greater of the
stipulated settlement amount, the amount actually paid in
settlement, or the settling defendant's equitable share of
liability.'8 This provision has the effect of sticking the plaintiff
with her bargain; if she gets less from the settling defendant
than the jury would have assessed against that defendant, the
plaintiff must absorb the difference. Finally-and most
importantly for defendants considering settlement-the statute
bars any non-settling defendants from seeking contribution from
the settling defendant.19
Initially, the provision in the statute limiting the amount
the plaintiff can recover from the non-settling defendants caused
confusion in cases where more than one defendant settles. For
example, assume that plaintiff, P, has sued three defendants, D1,
D2, and D3. P settles with Di for $45,000 and with D2 for
$10,000. D3 does not settle, and at trial the jury awards
$100,000 in damages and finds Di 5% liable, D2 55% liable, and
D3 40% liable. D3 has a right to a reduction in the amount it
must pay of the greater of the settlement amounts or the settling
defendants' equitable shares of fault. Defendants in D3's position
argued that they should be able to pick the greater amount for
each settling defendant. In the hypothetical case, then, D3 would
argue that it could get a reduction of $45,000 for D1 plus $55,000
for D2 (55% of $100,000) for a total of $100,000, thus effectively
wiping out its liability. In Didner v. Keene Corp.,20 the Court of
Appeals rejected that theory, concluding that the non-settling
defendant gets a reduction equal to the greater of the aggregate
settlement amounts or the aggregate shares of fault. Thus, in
the hypothetical case, D3 would get a reduction of $60,000 (5% of
$100,000 plus 55% of $100,000), leaving it with a well-deserved
liability of $40,000.
C. Comparative Fault Under CPLR Article 14-A
Joint defendants had not been the only ones suf.ering under
18 Id. § 15-108(a) ("[A] release... does not discharge any of the other
tortfeasors from liability... , but it reduces the claim of the releasor against the
other tortfeasors to the extent of any amount stipuleted [sic] by the release of the
covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it, or in the amount of the
released tortfeasors equitable share of damages..., whichever is the greatest.").
19 Id. § 15-108(b) ("A release given... to one tortfeasor... relieves him from
liability to any other person for contribution.. .
20 624 N.E.2d 979 (N.Y. 1993).
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the rigid pre-Dole liability regime. Under New York's draconian
common-law contributory negligence doctrine, a plaintiff who
was shown to bear any responsibility for her injury could recover
nothing.2' Despite mounting criticism of the contributory
negligence doctrine after Dole, the Court of Appeals refused to
move toward a more lenient comparative negligence regime,
expressly leaving the subject to the legislature. 22 Shortly after
passing Article 14, the legislature responded by adding Article
14-A, which has the effect of including any culpability on the
plaintiffs part in the damages apportionment calculus.
Article 14-A adopts a pure comparative fault regime for tort
damages.23 The plaintiff may recover for any share of fault for
which the defendants are liable, even if the plaintiffs share of
fault exceeds 50% and regardless of whether the plaintiffs fault
is characterized as "contributory negligence," "assumption of the
risk," or something else.24
Following the passage of Article 14-A, questions arose about
how to apportion damages where a contributorily negligent
plaintiff settles with some, but not all defendants. In Whalen v.
Kawasaki Motors Corporation, U.S.A., 25 the Court of Appeals
offered a partial answer. Again, under GOL section 15-108, the
liability of a non-settling defendant is reduced by the greater of
the settlement amounts or the shares of fault of the settling
defendants. In Whalen, the plaintiff settled prior to trial with
the defendant Kawasaki for $1,600,000.26 The plaintiff
continued to trial against the second defendant, Robinson, and
21 See WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7, % 1401.07 (describing background to
contributory negligence rule).
22 See Codling v. Paglia, 288 N.E.2d 622, 630 (N.Y. 1973) (acknowledging that
the doctrine has been criticized but holding that it is "a topic now more appropriate
for legislative redress").
23 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1411 (McKinney 1997). Like the contribution regime in
Article 14, Article 14-A applies in any action to recover damages for personal injury,
injury to property, or wrongful death. It is not limited to negligence actions.
24 The practice commentaries to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1411 explain that the plaintiff
may be barred from any recovery if the plaintiffs injuries "are the direct result of
his commission of... serious criminal or illegal conduct," if the plaintiff "expressly"
assumes the risk, or if the plaintiff assumes the risk in a way that relieves the
defendant's duty to the plaintiff, such as where a person voluntarily engages in
athletic activities. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1411 (practice commentary) (quoting Barker v.
Kallash, 468 N.E.2d 39, 42 (N.Y. 1984)).
25 Whalen v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 703 N.E.2d 246 (N.Y. 1998).
26 See id. at 247.
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no evidence of Kawasaki's culpability was introduced.27 The jury
returned a verdict for plaintiff in the amount of $2,415,000, but
found plaintiff 92% at fault and Robinson 8% at fault.28
Robinson argued that the plaintiffs share of fault (92% of
$2,415,000 or $2,221,800) should be subtracted from the total
liability first and then Kawasaki's settlement should be
subtracted from what remained.29 That would leave Robinson
with no liability ($2,415,000 - $2,221,800 - $1,600,000 = -
$1,406,800). The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the
settlement should be subtracted first and then the remaining
damages ($2,415,000 - $1,600,000 = $815,000) split between the
plaintiff and Robinson. That left Robinson with a liability of
$65,200 (8% of $815,000). 30
Unfortunately, Whalen is not the last word on the
interaction of Article 14-A and GOL section 15-108. It does not
explain how to calculate damages where the jury determines the
settling defendant's share of fault, as would normally occur to
allow the court to determine whether the actual settlement or
the percentage share of fault is greater for purposes of applying
GOL section 15-108. This is an issue I will return to in
describing the assumptions that underlie my formula.
D. Limitations on Joint and Several Liability Under CPLR
Article 16
In 1986, the legislature took its boldest step yet to modify
the relative liability of joint tortfeasors. Under traditional rules
of joint and several liability, a defendant with any share of the
liability-even one percent-can be forced to pay the full
judgment and then seek contribution from the others. But the
right to seek contribution offers little comfort when the other
tortfeasors are judgment-proof. Although Dole and its statutory
counterparts eased some of the burden on joint tortfeasors by
providing a procedural avenue for recovering excess damages
paid, they did little to help the deep pocket who gets stuck
paying an award for insolvent co-defendants.
Municipalities have frequently found themselves in this
27 See id.
28 See id.
29 See id. at 249.
3o See id. at 249-51 (explaining the reasoning behind the Court's adoption of
the "settlement-first" approach).
2001] 433
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position. Often a person injured by the negligence of a private
party will name the municipality as a co-defendant, alleging that
poor lighting or bad roads or something else of that kind
contributed to the accident.3 1 The municipality ends up paying
the full judgment and then taking its chances recovering from
the other culpable parties. As part of a broader tort reform
package passed in 1986, municipalities-aided by liability
insurers-prevailed on the legislature to put some of the
financial burden resulting from insolvent defendants on the
plaintiff. The resulting legislation was codified as Article 16 of
the CPLR. 3 2
Under certain circumstances, Article 16 limits the liability of
a joint tortfeasor whose share of the fault is 50% or less to that
tortfeasor's actual percentage share of the damages. The statute
applies only to non-economic damages (e.g., pain and suffering),33
meaning such a tortfeasor will still potentially have to pay 100%
of the economic damages (e.g., medical bills, lost wages, etc.).
Nevertheless, a minor tortfeasor can see substantial savings.
For example, assume P proves $20,000 in economic damages and
$80,000 in non-economic damages. The jury finds Di 70% at
fault and D2 30% at fault. Under traditional rules, D2 could be
forced to pay the full $100,000 award. Under Article 16,
however, the most D2 could be required to pay would be $44,000
(the full economic damages plus 30% of the non-economic
damages). If D2 paid that amount, under Article 14 it would then
have the right to recover $14,000 (the excess it paid over its
share of the economic damages) from Di.
The limitations on joint and several liability in Article 16
apply only to claims for personal injuxy. In addition, for
purposes of determining the defendants' relative shares of fault,
the culpability of any absent tortfeasor is to be considered only if
the plaintiff could have obtained jurisdiction over that person
"with due diligence."3 4 Furthermore, Article 16's limitation on
liability does not operate at all in certain common joint and
several liability situations, the most important being "actions
31 See DAVID D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE § 168A (3d. ed. 1999).
32 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1600-03 (McKinney 1997).
33 See id. 1600 (defining non-economic loss to include pain and suffering,
mental anguish, and loss of consortium).
34 Id. 1601M1.
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requiring proof of intent"35 and claims against persons held
liable by reason of the "use, operation, or ownership of a motor
vehicle."36
Article 16 expressly provides that it is not to be construed
"to affect or impair any right of a tortfeasor under section 15-108
of the general obligations law."37 Thus, in cases in which Article
16 applies, a settlement by fewer than all defendants calls for an
adjustment of damages based both on GOL section 15-108 and
on Article 16. Under Article 14-A, any share of fault borne by
the plaintiff must also be considered. The resulting damages
calculation can be, to say the least, complicated. As yet, no court
has attempted a comprehensive reconciliation of all these
statutes. The remainder of this Article offers such reconciliation.
Needless to say, not all four statutory provisions apply in every
case. For purposes of this Article, I will explain the methodology
using as an example a case involving all four provisions. I hope
by doing so to show that the methodology will work when all
apply. In simpler cases, any unnecessary steps can simply be
omitted and the method still works.
II. THE ASSUMPTIONS
Because of the lack of case law synthesizing the statutes, it
is not clear what priority to give the various provisions.
Accordingly, I made three major assumptions based on the
available authority and the apparent purpose of the statutes.
These assumptions address: (1) the application of Article 16
where the plaintiff bears some of the fault; (2) the allocation of
damages between economic and non-economic categories for
Article 16 purposes; and (3) the apportionment of liability among
remaining culpable parties after the GOL section 15-108 set-off.
A. The Interaction of Article 16 and Article 14-A
The first assumption involves the effect of any fault of the
plaintiff on the computation of the defendants' shares under
Article 16. Article 16 does not make clear whether its
limitations apply to any defendant with 50% or less of the total
fault, or to any defendant with 50% or less of the defendants'
35 Id. 1602(5).
36 Id. 1602(6).
37 Id. 1601(2).
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share of the fault, excluding any culpability on the part of the
plaintiff.38
The distinction can make a difference. For example, in
Robinson v. June,3 9 an assault case, the jury found a tavern
owner 50% liable, the two patrons who committed the assault
45% liable, and the plaintiff 5% liable. The tavern owner argued
that, because its share of fault was only 50% of the total fault, it
was responsible only for its equitable share of the plaintiffs non-
economic damages under Article 16.40 The plaintiff contended
that the tavern owner should get the benefit of Article 16's
limitations only if its share of the fault borne by the defendants
(not counting the plaintiffs share) was 50% or less.41 The
Supreme Court of Tompkins County agreed with the plaintiff. It
removed the plaintiffs percentage share and then extrapolated
the remaining 95% of the fault to 100% to determine the relative
percentage shares of the defendants. 42 Because the tavern
owner's extrapolated share was 52.6% (50% 95% = 52.6%), the
court held the tavern owner jointly liable for all damages
attributed to the defendants.
No court higher than the Robinson court has addressed this
question. But the rationale enunciated by the Robinson court is
a strong one, and suggests that its decision should be followed.
The court stressed that joint and several liability traditionally
existed to protect the plaintiff:
The policy behind the common-law rule which imposes joint
and several liability upon tortfeasors who contribute, in
whatever degree, to the same injury is based upon the sense
that compensation of the relatively innocent victim serves a
more important purpose than striking a nuanced balance
between and among the relatively guilty.43
The court then noted that Article 16 exists to remedy the
injustice that can occur "where the disparity between minor fault
and major financial punishment becomes extreme."44 Finding
38 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1601 (McKinney 1998) (using language in CPLR 1601-
"the total liability assigned to all persons liable" and "the relative culpability of each
person causing or contributing to the total liability"--that is unclear).
39 637 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996).
40 See id. at 1022.
41 See id. at 1022-23.
42 See id.
43 Id. at 1022.
44 Id.
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that no such disparity existed, given the fact that the jury found
the tavern owner 50% at fault, the court concluded that the
tavern owner should not get the benefit of the rule.45
Professor David Siegel concurs. Calling the issue "a
fundamental one," he argues that the removal of the plaintiffs
percentage share is "[plrobably more consistent with the overall
structure of Article 16."46 Given the extensive list in CPLR 1602
of circumstances in which the limitations on liability do not
apply, Professor Siegel concludes that the legislature would have
excluded the plaintiffs share if they had considered the issue.47
Based on Tompkins and Professor Siegel's analysis, I assume
that the plaintiffs percentage share of fault is not considered in
calculating the defendants' relative percentage shares for Article
16 purposes. Note that this question is separate from the one
answered by the Court of Appeals in Whalen, which addressed
the point at which plaintiffs share of the damages should be
removed for purposes of applying GOL section 15-108. 48
B. Identifying Economic and Non-Economic Damages After
Settlement with Fewer Than All Defendants
The second assumption involves the identification of
economic and non-economic damages for purposes of
apportionment under Article 16. The potential difficulty here
stems from the apportionment of damages after a settlement
with fewer than all defendants. It will not always be clear that
every defendant should bear the same proportion of economic
and non-economic damages; a settlement might even stipulate
that it is for one or the other. It could be argued in some cases
45 See id. The Robinson court also cited the shibboleth that statutes in
derogation of the common-law should be construed narrowly and pointed out that
CPLR 1603 puts the burden of establishing the right to "separate" liability on the
defendant. Id.
46 SIEGEL, supra note 31, § 168B.
47 See id. Professor Seigel points out an interesting anomaly that can occur if
the plaintiffs share is removed. In a case to which Article 16 applies, assume the
jury finds $100,000 in non-economic damages and finds P 40% at fault, D1 40% at
fault, and D2 20% at fault. Removing P's share leaves Di with 66.6% of the
remaining fault. If D2 is insolvent, Di picks up the whole tab and the plaintiff
recovers $60,000 from D 1. But if in the same case the jury finds P only 20% at fault
and both Di and D2 40% at fault, each defendant will bear only 50% of the remaining
fault. Thus, if D2 cannot pay, P can collect only Dl's $40,000 equitable share. The
more innocent plaintiff collects less.
48 See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
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that the damages left after settlement are entirely economic,
potentially leaving the remaining defendants without the benefit
of Article 16. The jury's verdict, however, will allocate the total
damages-not taking settlements into account-to economic or
non-economic categories. Both the Brooklyn Navy Yard court
and a state trial court have concluded that the best way to avoid
problems is simply to assume that the proportion of economic to
non-economic damages prescribed by the jury for the total
damages is the same as the proportion of economic to non-
economic damages for the damages remaining after settlement.49
I follow that suggestion.
C. Calculating the Judgment After the Section 15-108 Set-off
The third and final assumption involves the calculation of
the judgment to be entered against the non-settling defendants
after the GOL section 15-108 set-off. After the shares of the
settling defendants are removed, a pot of damages will remain to
be allocated among the non-settling defendants. Determining
the judgment to be entered against each defendant requires
removing any culpability assigned to the plaintiff and then
apportioning the remaining damages against the defendants in
accord with Article 16.
The key to understanding the damages calculation is to
recognize that all culpable parties-including culpable plaintiffs
and non-settling defendants-collectively bear responsibility for
100% of the damages remaining after the GOL section 15-108
set-off.50 Assuming the settling defendant(s) also bear some
degree of fault, however, the percentages of fault assigned to the
plaintiff and non-settling defendants will not add up to 100%. To
figure out what share of the damages to assign to each culpable
party, we must figure out each party's proportional share of the
damages remaining after the GOL section 15-108 set-off such
that collectively the remaining parties account for 100% of those
damages. The way to do that is to remove the percentage share
of fault assigned to the settling defendant(s) and then
49 See In re Brooklyn Navy Yard, 971 F.2d 831, 849 (2d Cir. 1992); Court
Decisions, Court Keeps Liability as Set by Jury for Remaining Tortfeasor,
Dominguez v. Fixrammer Corp., N.Y. L.J, Mar. 13, 1997, at 25.
50 This point is implicit in the Whalen decision, in which the Court held that
the GOL § 15-108 set-off should be made before any fault on the plaintiff's part is
taken into account. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
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extrapolate the remaining parties' shares of fault out to 100%.
Some examples should help make this clear.
Assume P sues Di, D2 and D3 and settles with D3 for $40,000.
The jury returns a verdict for $100,000 in non-economic damages
and finds P 20% at fault, Di 20% at fault, D2 30% at fault, and D3
30% at fault. Assuming all defendants get the benefit of Article
16, both D2 and D3 would bear only several liability for the non-
economic damages, since they are each 50% or less at fault.
Under Whalen, the first step in the damages calculation is to
perform the GOL section 15-108 set-off. In this case, because the
actual settlement was greater than the settling defendant's
equitable share of the damages, the settlement amount of
$40,000 is removed, leaving a pot of damages of $60,000 to be
split among the plaintiff and the non-settling defendants.
Again, the plaintiff and the non-settling defendants should
collectively bear responsibility for 100% of that $60,000. To
calculate each of their equitable shares, we must extrapolate
their percentage shares of fault out to 100% and then multiply
the resulting percentages by the $60,000 in damages remaining
after the application of GOL section 15-108. The removal of Di's
percentage share leaves 80% of the fault remaining.
Extrapolating the shares of P, D2 and D3 leaves P responsible for
25% of the remaining damages (20% + 80% = 25%), and D2 and
D3 each responsible for 37.5% of the remaining damages (30% -
80% = 37.5%). Thus, a judgment would be entered against each
defendant for $22,500 (37.5% X $60,000 = $22,500). With the
plaintiff absorbing its share of $15,000 (25% X $60,000 =
$15,000), the full $60,000 has been allocated among the culpable
parties and none is responsible above its equitable share.51
Things get a little trickier where the damages include both
economic and non-economic components, so that the defendants
potentially have joint liability for part of the damages but only
several liability for the rest. Assume in the above hypothetical
51 Note that the plaintiff and the defendants split the windfall created by D2's
excessive settlement. D2 should have been liable for only $20,000, but settled for
$40,000. Of the $20,000 difference, P saw a $5,000 reduction in its share and the
defendants each saw a $7,500 reduction in their shares. This will be the result
whenever the settling defendant pays more than its equitable share in settlement.
In a case in which the equitable share is greater, the plaintiff will pay exactly its
adjudicated percentage of the total damages and will also absorb the difference
between the settlement amount and the settling defendant's equitable share. The
example given in Part I1 demonstrates that scenario.
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that the jury awarded $20,000 in economic damages and $80,000
in non-economic damages. The GOL section 15-108 set-off leaves
damages of $60,000. Under my second assumption, we allocate
that amount to economic and non-economic categories in the
proportion assigned by the jury, so that $12,000 is considered
economic damages (20% x $60,000 = $12,000) and $48,000 is
considered non-economic damages (80% x $60,000 = $48,000).
Assuming the defendants get the benefit of Article 16, they
would each be jointly liable for the full $12,000 in economic
damages, but only severally liable for the $48,000 in non-
economic damages, because each is 50% or less at fault. But we
still need to know each party's equitable share, so we perform
the same extrapolation, again leaving the plaintiff with a 25%
equitable share and each defendant with a 37.5% equitable
share. Instead of simply multiplying those extrapolated
percentages by the total remaining damages, however, two
separate calculations must be made. First, the plaintiffs share
of the economic damages is removed, leaving $9,000 in economic
damages allocated to the defendants (75% of $12,000 is $9,000).
The defendants are jointly liable for that amount, meaning each
could be forced to pay the full amount. (To the extent either
pays more than its equitable share of $4,500 (37.5% x $12,000 =
$4,500), however, it can seek contribution from the other under
Article 14. But each defendant is only severally liable for its
share of the non-economic damages. Each defendant's several
liability is determined by multiplying its equitable share by the
total non-economic damages left after the GOL section 15-108
set-off. Thus, each defendant is liable for $18,000 in non-
economic damages (37.5% x $48,000 = $18,000). The judgment to
be entered against each defendant is $27,000 (the full $9,000 in
economic damages plus the $18,000 in non-economic damages).
This step in the analysis is where the court erred in
Brooklyn Navy Yard. The court described a hypothetical case
involving three defendants, A, B, and C, in which the jury
awards $75,000 in non-economic damages and $25,000 in
economic damages, and finds each defendant 33.3% at fault. The
plaintiff has settled with A for $39,000. B and C both get the
benefit of Article 16. After removing A's settlement share of
$39,000 (the greater of the actual settlement or A's equitable
share of the damages), B and C are responsible for a total of
$61,000 in damages. The court assumed that the $61,000 total
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damages should be divided into economic and non-economic
shares in the proportion determined by the jury, so that B and C
would be jointly liable for 25%, or $15,250, but only severally
liable for the remaining 75%, or $45,750.52 Instead of
extrapolating to calculate B and C's equitable shares of the
liability remaining after the operation of GOL section 15-108 and
then multiplying that percentage by the remaining non-economic
damages, the court used the defendants' original percentage
shares of fault (33.3%) to determine the judgments that should
be entered. Multiplying those percentages by the amount of non-
economic damages, the court concluded that each defendant
would be liable for $25,000 in non-economic damages (33.3% x
$75,000 = $25,000). The court thus concluded that a judgment
should be entered against B and C for $40,250 each ($15,250 in
economic damages plus $25,000 in non-economic damages).
The problem with that result is that it could allow the
plaintiff to collect more from either B or C than the legislature
apparently intended. Under GOL section 15-108, B and C share
liability for no more than $61,000. Of that amount, they are
jointly liable for the economic damages of $15,250. Either one
could be forced to pay that full amount and would be entitled to
contribution from the other for any excess paid over the payor's
equitable share. With respect to the non-economic damages of
$45,750, however, neither one should have to pay more than its
equitable share, even if the other is insolvent. As a consequence,
the judgments entered against B and C for non-economic
damages should not exceed $45,750. Under the court's approach
in Brooklyn Navy Yard, judgments would be entered against B
and C for $25,000 each in non-economic damages, or $50,000
total. Although the plaintiff could not actually recover the excess
$4,250 above its non-economic damages ($50,000 - $45,750 =
$4,250), if one defendant is insolvent, the potential exists under
this approach for the plaintiff to collect more from the other
defendant than Article 16 should allow.53 Following my third
52 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
53 The Brooklyn Navy Yard court, perhaps unintentionally, intimated that its
formula could result in an unduly low verdict for the plaintiff. Brooklyn Navy Yard,
971 F.2d at 849-50 n.6. In the hypo I gave in the text, assume Di settles for $35,000
instead of $45,000. Under GOL § 15-108, the damages should be reduced by Di's
equitable share of the damages (40% x $100,000 = $40,000) leaving total damages
after settlement of $60,000 ($100,000 - $40,000 = $60,000). Again, under the court's
approach, the defendants would be liable for their raw shares, or $30,000 each. That
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assumption-that the judgments should be computed on the
basis of all culpable parties' extrapolated percentages of fault
after the GOL section 15-108 set-off-removes this possibility.
It is important to note that the extrapolation done at this
stage is solely for purposes of determining the amount of
damages; it plays no role in deciding whether any defendant gets
the benefit of several-only liability for non-economic damages
under Article 16. That determination is made based on the first
extrapolation (which removes the plaintiff's share of fault for
Article 16 purposes) and does not change. 54
III. THE FORMULA
Because lawyers as a profession tend to recoil from numbers,
I have tried to make the following formula as simple as possible.
I've broken it down into steps applying each of the statutory
commands, and I use a hypothetical case to demonstrate the
application at each step. Capitalized terms have consistent
meanings, as is apparent from the context. The formula
provides all the calculations necessary to apply CPLR Articles
14, 14-A, and 16 and GOL section 15-108. Not every case will
implicate every one of these provisions. Some cases will not
involve comparative fault on the plaintiffs part, others will not
involve a settlement. At each step, I indicate how the formula
should be modified to account for the absence of one or more of
these elements.
My hypothetical case involves a single plaintiff, P, who has
suffered a personal injury at a construction site as a result of the
joint negligence of three private party defendants, Di, D2, and
D3. Prior to trial, P settles with Di for $10,000. The case against
D2 and D3 proceeds to trial and verdict. The jury finds that P has
suffered $100,000 in damages, of which $20,000 is economic
damages and $80,000 is non-economic damages. The jury finds
would leave the plaintiff collecting total damages of only $95,000, rather than the
$100,000 awarded by the jury. But that is precisely the result the legislature
intended under GOL § 15-108: the plaintiff settled with D1 for too little and mustbear the burden of its own bad bargain. The court's formula in Brooklyn Navy Yard,
then, causes problems only when the settlement is for more than the settling
defendant's actual share of the damages.
54 In the formula given in Part III, the first extrapolation, which determines
whether the defendants get the benefit of Article 16, occurs in Step 1. The second
extrapolation, which determines the analytically distinct question of the judgments
to be entered against non-settling defendants, occurs in Step 4.
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further that P was 10% at fault, Di was 20% at fault, D2was 50%
at fault, and D3 was 20% at fault. The issue: What judgments
should be entered against D2 and D3?
Step 1:
The first step is to determine each defendant's Share of
Fault for CPLR Article 16 purposes. This step will tell us which
defendants will ultimately be jointly liable for all damages and
which will have several-only liability with respect to non-
economic damages. The calculation of the defendants' Shares of
Fault should be made after the plaintiffs share of fault, if any, is
removed. To do this, the plaintiffs percentage share is removed
and the defendants' shares are extrapolated out to 100%.55
Example:
The jury determined that P was 10% at fault. To
extrapolate the defendants' shares, simply divide each
defendant's share by 90% (the percentage remaining after P's
share is removed). D1 then has a 22% Share of Fault, D2 has a
56% Share of Fault, and D3, has a 22% Share of Fault.
Accordingly, D2 will be jointly liable for all damages, while D3
will be jointly liable for economic damages but only severally
liable for non-economic damages. Di, having settled, has no
further liability.
If the plaintiff has no share of the fault, this step should be
skipped and the application of Article 16 determined based on
the percentage shares of fault assigned to the defendants by the
fact-finder.
Step 2:
The next step, under GOL section 15-108, is to determine
the Total Remaining Damages to be allocated among all culpable
parties by subtracting from the total liability the greater of
either the aggregate percentage share of the damages of the
settling defendants or the aggregate settlement amounts agreed
to by the settling defendants. 56
55 See supra notes 38-48 and accompanying text.
56 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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Example:
The total damages found by the jury are $100,000. Prior to
trial, Di settled with P for $10,000. Di's culpability, however,
was 20%. Because Di's percentage share of the damages,
$20,000, is greater than the $10,000 settlement amount, the
remaining damages are reduced by Di's share of the damages.
Thus, the Total Remaining Damages are $100,000 - $20,000
$80,000.
This step should be skipped if there have been no
settlements.
Step 3:
Applying Article 16 requires determining what proportion of
the Total Remaining Damages is economic and what proportion
is non-economic. To do this, assume that the proportion of
economic to non-economic damages is the same for Total
Remaining Damages as it was for the full damages amount.57
Then multiply the Total Remaining Damages by the percentage
attributable to each category.
Example:
Of the $100,000 in total damages, $20,000 was for economic
damages and $80,000 was for non-economic damages.
Accordingly, the Remaining Economic Damages will be 20% of
the Total Remaining Damages, or $16,000 (20% x $80,000 =
$16,000). The Remaining Non-economic Damages will be 80% of
the Total Remaining Damages, or $64,000 (80% x $80,000 =
$64,000).
Step 4:
The plaintiff and the non-settling defendants are collectively
responsible for the Total Remaining Damages. Determining the
actual judgments to be entered against the non-settling
defendants requires determining each defendant's Equitable
Share of the Remaining Liability. That is done by removing the
settling defendants' shares of fault and then extrapolating the
defendants' (and the plaintiffs) shares of fault out to 100%.58 The
resulting figures will be used in calculating each defendant's
57 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
58 See supra notes 520-531 and accompanying text.
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right to contribution under CPLR Article 14 and in calculating
any defendant's reduced liability for non-economic damages
under Article 16. Keep in mind that these Equitable Shares of
the Remaining Liability are for the purpose of determining the
amount of damages only; they do not affect the determination of
whether the defendants get the benefit of Article 16. That
determination was made in Step 1 and does not change.
Example:
Di's share of fault as determined by the jury is 20%. That
leaves P, D2, and D3 collectively responsible for 80% of the
liability. Extrapolating their equitable shares to 100% leaves D2
with an Equitable Share of the Remaining Liability of 62.5%
(50% + 80% = 62.5%), and D3 with an Equitable Share of the
Remaining Liability of 25% (20% - 80% = 25%). P is responsible
for 12.5% of the Total Remaining Damages (10% + 80% = 12.5%),
which is equivalent to 10% of the total damages. 59
If there have been no settlements, this step should be
skipped and the shares of fault assigned by the fact-finder
should be used to calculate the judgments to be entered against
each defendant. If there has been a settlement, but the plaintiff
has no share of the fault, this step should still be taken using
only the non-settling defendants' shares of fault.
Step 5:
The next step is to determine the amounts of Remaining
Economic Damages and Remaining Non-economic Damages for
which the non-settling defendants are liable. This will tell us
the maximum amount of damages the plaintiff will be entitled to
recover. It is done by removing the shares of those damages for
which the plaintiff is responsible. The resulting amounts are the
Defendants' Remaining Economic Damages and the Defendants'
Remaining Non-economic Damages. The sum of these two
amounts is the total amount of damages the plaintiff can
recover.
59 In fact, P ultimately will bear more than its equitable share of the total
damages because P made a bad settlement with D1. P released D3 for less than Di's
equitable share so P will have to absorb the difference. See supra note 51 and
accompanying text.
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Example:
P is responsible for 12.5% of both the Remaining Economic
Damages and the Remaining Non-economic Damages. Removing
those shares leaves $14,000 in Defendants' Remaining Economic
Damages (87.5% x $16,000 = $14,000) and $56,000 in
Defendants' Remaining Non-economic Damages (87.5% x
$64,000 = $56,000). Thus, the plaintiff can recover a total of
$70,000 ($14,000 + $56,000 = $70,000).
If the plaintiff has no share of the fault, this step should be
skipped. In such a case, the Remaining Economic Damages are
the same as the Defendants' Remaining Economic Damages and
the Remaining Non-economic Damages are the same as the
Defendants' Remaining Non-economic Damages. The plaintiff is
entitled to recover the full amount of the Total Remaining
Damages.
Step 6:
The final step is to determine the judgment to be entered
against each non-settling defendant. Each defendant is jointly
and severally liable for all of the Defendants' Remaining
Economic Damages. In addition, any defendant with a Share of
Fault greater than 50% (from Step 1) will be jointly liable for all
of the Defendants' Remaining Non-economic Damages.
Judgment will be entered against any such defendant for the
sum of those two amounts. Other defendants are only severally
liable for the Remaining Non-economic Damages. To calculate
the judgment to be entered against such a defendant, multiply
the defendant's Equitable Share of the Remaining Liability (from
Step 4) by the Remaining Non-economic Damages60 and add that
figure to the full amount of the Defendants' Remaining Economic
Damages.
Example:
Because D2 has a Share of Fault greater than 50%, D2 is
jointly liable for the Defendants' Remaining Economic Damages
60 Note that the correct figure here is the Remaining Non-economic Damages
and not the Defendants' Remaining Non-economic Damages. To calculate each
defendant's several liability for non-economic damages, multiply that defendant's
Equitable Share of the Remaining Liability by the entire amount of the Remaining
Non-economic Damages. The sum of the resulting amounts is the Defendants'
Remaining Non-economic Damages.
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and Remaining Non-economic Damages. Judgment should be
entered against D2 in the amount of $70,000. D3, however, has a
Share of Fault of 50% or less. D3 is jointly liable for all of the
Defendants' Remaining Economic Damages but only severally
liable for the Remaining Non-economic Damages. Judgment
should be entered against D3 in the amount of $30,000 ((25% x
$64,000 = $16,000) + $14,000 = $30,000).
Addenda
Two final points should be kept in mind. First, P cannot
recover more than the total amount for which the non-settling
defendants are liable. That amount is $70,000 (see Step 5).
Thus, even though the total judgments entered against D2 and
D3 add up to $100,000, P may actually recover only $70,000.
Second, under Article 14, all non-settling defendants have rights
of contribution against other non-settling tortfeasors to the
extent they pay P more than their Equitable Shares of the
Remaining Liability. Thus, if D2 is forced to pay more than
$50,000 ($80,000 x 62.5%), D2 has a right to recover the excess
from D3. D3 has reciprocal rights to the extent D3 pays more than
$20,000 ($80,000 x 25%).61
CONCLUSION
Does the formula work the way it is supposed to? Yes. P's
damages are $100,000. After the settlement with D3 is removed,
the damages remaining are $80,000. Because P was partially at
fault, P cannot recover that full amount. P is responsible for
12.5% of that amount, meaning P should recover no more than
$70,000.62 Under the formula, that is exactly what P would be
entitled to receive. Finally, the formula properly effects Article
16 by ensuring that D3, a non-settling tortfeasor with 50% or less
culpability, will have to pay no more than its equitable share of
the non-economic damages, even if D2 is insolvent.
61 Note that since D3 gets the benefit of Article 16, it could not be forced to pay
more than its equitable share of the non-economic damages. But, it might be forced
to pay more than its share of the economic damages, and it would have a right to
contribution for the excess paid.
62 Although P was only 10% at fault, P must absorb more than 10% of the loss
because P made a bad settlement with Di In a case in which the settlement amount
exceeds the settling defendant's equitable share, P would split the windfall with the
non-settling defendants and absorb less than its equitable share of the loss. See
supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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